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The EU decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey has put a series of questions 
back on the agenda: where (rather than when) should Europe’s enlargement end, where do 
Europe’s borders lie and, ultimately, what is the essence and identity of Europe? That is be-
cause for the first time in its history, the EU decided to invite a country which can be defined 
geographically, historically and culturally both as European and – arguably even more – as 
Asian or non-European. As Bulgarian journalist Toni Ivanov justifiably notes in Obektiv: 
In this sense the decision … wasn’t even ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to Turkey. It meant saying ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ to Europe. And, moreover, to what kind of Europe? If not up to the Urals, as de 
Gaulle once dreamt, then up to where? (Nikolov 2005). 
This question has opened up a visible divide: between opponents and proponents of Europe’s 
enlargement towards Turkey. But this visible divide hides a much greater division and diver-
sity of viewpoints. The opponents of Turkey’s accession are as diverse in their politics and 
values as are the proponents. This division on the question has not simply reinforced the al-
ready existing divisions between Left and Right, conservatives and socialists, liberals and na-
tionalists, but has appeared within almost all of the classical political camps. 
The arguments used by the opponents and proponents of Turkey’s EU accession represent 
different political visions about European enlargement. This difference can be traced back to 
the very beginning of European integration, which was launched empirically, without an initial 
‘master plan’ indicating what kind of community would be built in the long term. That is why at 
every point in its existence, the EU has been faced with the question of what is its essence, 
where does it want to go, what is the big goal it wants to achieve. 
The invitation to Turkey has given new urgency to these questions, especially after the Mem-
ber States signed in Lisbon a new treaty replacing the failed EU Constitution, with which they 
reached a successive compromise on the nature of the Union. However, along with these 
questions related to institutional development, the accession of a country like Turkey poses a 
number of new problems, as it affects delicate consensuses and balances within the Union 
and allows every participant in the debate to expound their vision for the EU in a more explicit 
way. 
This paper will analyse these arguments in an attempt to classify them by type and recon-
struct the underlying visions about Europe. The typology of these visions will help us under-
stand the European political process precisely as a supranational one. As regards the na-
tional political debates, in them the issue of Turkey’s EU membership has an instrumental 
character, enabling political parties to distance themselves from or align themselves with 
other parties, and to identify themselves politically. 
The arguments used in the debate on Turkey’s accession can be grouped into several main 
types: historico-cultural, geopolitical, military-strategic, socio-economic and socio-political. All 
of them are used by different political circles in almost all Member States. In Bulgaria, in par-
ticular, there is also a specific group of arguments associated with the specific political proc-
ess and role of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) in Bulgarian politics. 
The issue of Turkey’s membership has divided political parties in Bulgaria into two groups. 
The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), Simeon II National Movement (NDSV) and DPS, which 
make up the ruling coalition, have backed the government’s official position, expressed both 
by the prime minister and by the foreign minister, that Bulgaria supports Turkey’s bid for 
membership. In an interview for the Focus Agency, Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin expressed 
Bulgaria’s official position, which is in favour of Turkish accession without ignoring the reser-
vations of other European countries: 
Bulgaria has an interest in Turkey’s developing towards the EU – in Turkey’s adopting 
EU rules, standards and values, as it is our neighbour and a large country next to us. 
At the same time, EU membership cannot happen without compromise. This means 
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that before it becomes an EU member, Turkey must convince all European countries 
that it fully supports the rules, that it is fully capable of integrating into the European 
economy without any shocks (Kalfin 2007). 
Boyko Borissov, the leader of Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), also 
spoke out in favour of Turkey’s accession: 
GERB’s attitude towards Turkey is the same as that towards Serbia, Croatia, Mace-
donia… Everyone who meets the EU criteria will be accepted by the European coun-
tries. 
The Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), too, supports Turkey’s membership – unlike the other 
main right-wing party, Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB). Dimitar Avramov, a political 
analyst close to the SDS, expressly declares in his blog: 
Turkey was a loyal political ally of Bulgaria and supported our bid for NATO member-
ship at a time when this was a strategic choice of key importance for our national se-
curity. … That is why Bulgaria must support, and not block, Turkey’s integration into 
the EU! (Avramov 2006). 
The extreme nationalist “Ataka” and the DSB are the only two political parties that have taken 
a firm stand against Turkey’s accession. In Bulgaria, as in the other EU countries, the dividing 
line between proponents and opponents does not fully overlap with the dividing line between 
Left and Right.1 
 
1. Historical and Cultural Arguments 
One of the arguments frequently used by the opponents of accession is that Turkey is not a 
European country not so much in geographical as in cultural terms. The reason for their op-
position is ‘Turkey’s unfitness to become a lodger in the well-ordered Christian home of the 
Old Continent’, as Stefan Solakov writes in the Ataka daily (Solakov 2007). This thesis is sup-
ported most vehemently by extreme nationalists in Europe, and was repeated by French na-
tionalist leader Jean-Marie Le Pen during his visit to Sofia in 2007. 
The argument that Turkey is not a European country is based less on geographical evidence 
(just ten percent of the country’s territory is in Europe, the rest being in Asia) than on the the-
sis of the incompatibility between the ‘Christian roots’ of Europe and the Muslim religion 
dominant in Turkey. It is precisely this aspect of ‘cultural incompatibility’ that is most often 
cited by opponents. That is because this argument sees Europe primarily as a Christian 
community, or at best, as a community sharing ‘Christian values’. Opponents of Turkey’s ac-
cession often point out that Turkey is an Islamic country and a member of the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference, therefore has no place in the EU which is predominantly Christian. 
Dimitar Stoyanov, an MEP from Ataka, told participants in an anti-Turkish demonstration in 
Brussels on 3 October 2007 that it was unnatural for a society based on Christian values to 
unite with a Muslim country which, furthermore, is outside Europe’s borders (Shkodrova 
2005).2 
In the course of the debates on the European Constitution, there were heated arguments over 
whether to include a reference to the EU’s Christian cultural roots. Even before he was 
elected Pope Benedict XVI, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger had declared that as a Muslim coun-
try, Turkey has always been different from Europe, whose main characteristic is Christianity. 
                                                 
1 It is interesting that in the programme declaration of an entirely new party, Society for a New Bulgaria (ONB, 
founded in January 2007) – whose leaders are young people, including the former leader of the Youth Union of De-
mocratic Forces (MSDS) Kalin Metodiev – states clearly: ‘In our view, Europe should not enlarge beyond its cultural 
and geographical boundaries. Turkey’s accession to the EU is not in the interest either of Bulgaria or of Europe’ 
(http://www.obshtestvo.net/?p=466). 
2 Writing on a discussion forum of the e-vestnik online newspaper devoted to a Libération article by Turkish expert 
Cengiz Aktar about French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s position on Turkey’s EU accession, one of the participants 
(using the nickname Man’s Friend) points out the following arguments against: ‘The question is whether Turkey really 
is a secular state, and how Islam and Christianity will co-exist in one community. For Islam is 1,240 years old, while 
Christianity is 2,007. And while Christianity has outgrown its childish-adolescent implacability and militancy for pres-
ence and rule over the whole world, the same cannot be said of Islam. On the contrary, Islam is now at the age of 
Christianity (1,240 years) when human life had no value whatsoever to the Inquisition and the crusaders’ (http://e-
vestnik.bg/2907). 
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That is why, according to the future pope, two so very different continents (Europe and Asia) 
should not mix solely in the name of economic considerations – a common market – as this 
will harm cultural diversity. This thesis is also supported by the majority of Christian Democ-
ratic parties in Europe, such as those in Germany and Austria, which insisted on including the 
above-mentioned reference in European Constitution. 
However, the religious argument against Turkey’s EU accession poses a serious problem 
related to the very concept of the nature of the Union. Should it be conceived of as a Christian 
community? If it is, what implications would that have for non-Christian Europeans (the major-
ity of which are Muslim and Jewish)? Isn’t the EU, rather, a supra-national projection of the 
European secular state, in which religion is a matter of personal choice and of the private 
sphere only? The paradox is that the Turkish Republic, as conceived and created by Kemal 
Atatürk in the 1920s, is a secular state and that until now its secular character has been de-
fended most resolutely both by a significant part of Turkish society (primarily its modern-
minded, West-oriented part) and the top military, who are especially active in Turkish politics. 
The religious argument against Turkey’s EU accession de facto calls into question one of the 
major achievements of European civilisation: the secular state. 
Hence, the counter-argument of the proponents of accession is that Europe’s refusal may 
lead to Turkey’s Islamisation, rejection of the principles of the secular state and an end of the 
‘Atatürk era’. This argument cannot be ignored, as how Turkey will develop in future is un-
doubtedly important for the EU, regardless of whether it becomes a full member or remains a 
neighbour country in privileged partnership. 
Another argument used occasionally by opponents is that Turkey is continuing to follow the 
policy of expansionism pursued by the Ottoman Empire, of which it is the successor. This ar-
gument is based on the idea that irrespective of changes in the political regime, irrespective of 
modernisation and democratisation, states continue to follow their own logic, which is not 
changed by historical circumstances. 
Also among the historical arguments against Turkey’s EU accession are those related to the 
Turkish state’s refusal to recognise the Armenian genocide. The tragic events at the end of 
the First World War which led to the death of almost a million and a half Armenians remain a 
taboo in the political debate in Turkey. Bulgaria’s argument here has another, specific dimen-
sion: the accusation that the DPS openly supports the Turkish position on this question. As 
Bulgarian historian Bozhidar Dimitrov declared at a news conference: 
The parliaments of the USA, France, Poland and many European countries have 
condemned the Armenian genocide which Turkey conducted in 1915–1918. Under 
pressure from the DPS, the MPs from the three-party coalition are the only ones who 
have refused to do so (Chertova 2006). 
In the case of the Armenian genocide (even Turkish university intellectuals would never use 
this word), things are even more dramatic. Not because the scale of the event was unprece-
dented, but because in present-day republican Turkey this subject remains a taboo, whose 
very mention can lead to prosecution (as in the case of Orhan Pamuk, for example). 
This apparently historical argument is in fact a socio-political one, as it concerns the effective-
ness of democracy in present-day Turkey. Now this is an argument of another order. But in 
the context of the protests of Armenian communities in Europe against Turkey’s accession 
because of its refusal to recognise the Armenian genocide, far-right nationalist parties rallied 
and tried to use the political mobilisation around the issue to promote an extreme anti-Turkish 
discourse. For if the Armenian communities and their representatives as well as the social 
circles supporting them argue against Turkey’s accession because of the still existing ‘taboo’ 
on the subject (using the argument ‘insufficient democracy today’), the extreme nationalists 
advance the primitive thesis that ‘the Turks haven’t changed’, i.e. that they have remained as 
violent and brutal as they were in the fourteenth and the early twentieth centuries. 
A similar type of difference in the arguments is found in the case of the division of Cyprus and 
non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (a member of the EU) by Turkey. The problem is 
quite serious, especially considering that the EU has not recognised the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus founded as a result of the Turkish invasion in 1974. One should not forget, 
however, that the events back in 1974 were provoked by far-right nationalists in Greece, who 
organised a coup d’état against the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, which led to 
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the Turkish counter-reaction. And that in the referendum on unification, held in Cyprus on the 
eve of EU accession, Greek Cypriots voted no while Turkish Cypriots voted yes.3 Regarding 
the division of Cyprus, Greek far-right nationalists argue that it is proof of Turkey’s expansion-
ism, of its subscription to the historical idea of the unification of all Turks within one state. 
Paradoxically, extreme nationalists in the EU often support the idea of ‘every nation in one 
state’ as well. And they use this to criticise the nationalism of others – which, incidentally, is 
an all too familiar story. 
The question here is: What kind of EU do we want? A ‘Europe of sovereign nations’ is what 
the far right wants – a union without supra-national powers, where every nation strives to 
promote its own interests but where Christian values unite all nations. A Christian, albeit su-
pra-national, Europe is also what Christian Democrats want – but, unlike the far right, they 
insist on keeping alive the dialogue with other religions and civilisations. If the EU is a his-
torico-cultural community based on common religious roots, there is a huge risk that it will find 
itself involved in Samuel Huntington’s scenario of a ‘clash of civilisations’. 
 
2. Geopolitical Arguments 
While historical and cultural arguments tend to be used mainly by the opponents of Turkey’s 
EU accession, geopolitical arguments are advanced more often by the proponents of acces-
sion. Turkey is a large country with a huge demographic potential, which has a key geo-
graphical location between Europe and the Middle East and can play an important role as a 
‘guard’, ‘buffer’, and so on. These arguments are also often used by Turkish politicians and 
intellectuals in favour of accession. 
Turkey could be very useful as an external border of the EU: this is one of the common argu-
ments in favour of accession. The EU needs such a border, especially as regards the Near 
and Middle East, a source of risks of economic immigration, drugs and people trafficking, and 
generally, of transmission of insecurity and crime. That is why Turkey’s admission to the EU 
will increase the effectiveness of the European border, as Turkey will have the resources to 
become an effective ‘guard’ against these threats. And these threats are seen as threats to a 
key concept of the EU as a zone of security (individual and collective). 
The problem here is that these arguments represent the EU as an ‘island of prosperity and 
security’ which is surrounded by an ocean of poverty and insecurity and therefore needs a 
‘defence wall’. I will not review historical examples associated with this idea, such as the Ro-
man forts or the Great Wall of China, which proved totally ineffective in stopping the invading 
barbarians or Mongols. The question is whether we imagine the EU as ‘Fortress Europe’ 
guarded by ‘loyal guards’ (in this case, Turkey). 
During the political debate on Bulgaria’s NATO membership, enthusiastic proponents of ac-
cession pointed out as an advantage the fact that the country will be a ‘border’ or ‘defensive 
line’ of NATO to the East. In other words, that it will play the role of ‘guard’. The paradox here 
comes from the obvious contradiction between the aspiration for greater security through 
NATO membership and the declared desire to play a role full of insecurity and risks, such as 
the role of every ‘defensive line’ or ‘guard’ is. 
There is a similar paradox in the case of Turkey’s EU membership. The EU needs the Turks 
because they will serve as a ‘defensive line’, but the Turks need the EU in order to feel more 
secure. We hear essentially the same argument from a number of neoconservatives in the 
USA who promote Turkey’s EU accession – a position typical of the school of realism in inter-
national relations. 
                                                 
3 See Georgi Kamov’s interesting commentary at blogger.com, where he reminds readers of the following: ‘In No-
vember 2002 then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a plan for settling the Cyprus conflict on the basis of 
the federal principle. Just one month later, the EU invited the Republic of Cyprus to join the Union together with an-
other nine countries. The denouement of the long and tortuous negotiations between the presidents of the Greek 
Republic of Cyprus Tassos Papadopoulos and of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Mehmet Ali Talat was the 
scheduling of simultaneous referendums on the Annan Plan in the two republics on 24 April 2004. The results of the 
referendums were that the Greek Cypriots rejected the Plan by more than 75 percent, while the Turkish Cypriots 
approved it by approximately 65 percent of the vote. Yet despite these results, the Greek part of the island officially 
became an EU member on 1 May 2004 – one week after the referendums on the unification of Cyprus’ (Kamov 
2006). 
Antony Todorov 
5 
From this geopolitical perspective, Turkey can also be seen as a mediator in EU relations with 
the Muslim world. If it doesn’t want to get drawn into ‘the-clash-of-civilisations’ scenario, the 
EU must admit Turkey precisely because the latter can be an excellent mediator in relations 
with the Islamic countries. A predominantly Islamic but also a modern, European country, 
Turkey can be both a spokesman of Europeans among Muslims and a spokesman of Muslims 
among Europeans. 
Accession proponents would also add another argument in this perspective: despite the risk 
of introducing the religious dimension, it is indisputably better to have secular Turkey as an 
advocate of Muslims in Europe rather than, as in many cases, Saudi Arabia. Experts on Is-
lamic doctrine would add that the Wahhabi Saudi strand of Islam is much more radical and 
fundamentalist than the Sunni strand of Islam dominant in Turkey. 
Such a role looks acceptable and is used as an argument in favour of Turkey’s accession. As 
Iliya Petrov, a former MP from the SDS who joined the Conservative Union EKIP, notes: 
As Turkey’s admission is also of key importance for relations between the EU and the 
Islamic world, it will also confirm the vision that we can live together in Europe while 
keeping our diversity (Petrov 2006). 
On the other hand, however, such a role raises a number of questions. The main question is 
whether it presupposes that as an EU member Turkey will have an almost monopoly right (for 
no other country in the Union is regarded as predominantly Muslim) to speak on behalf of the 
Muslims – both in and outside Europe. Such a claim conjures up memories of the caliphate, 
abolished in the secular republic even upon the first reforms conducted by Kemal Atatürk. In 
other words, in an effort to rule out ‘the-clash-of-civilisations’ scenario, we again assign par-
ticular countries a specific role in the religious, i.e. civilisational, perspective. 
In the same geopolitical perspective, accession proponents also point to Turkey’s role as a 
bridge between Europe and Asia. Conversely, opponents argue that bringing the EU borders 
close to high-risk regions like the Near and Middle East (Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan) would 
increase the risks to European security. Some suggest that instead of granting Turkey full 
membership, it would be wiser to consider other options such as, for example, granting it spe-
cial privileges in the field of trade and movement of people in exchange for a commitment to 
act as a ‘buffer’ or ‘mitigator’ of risks. 
From a geopolitical perspective, Turkey is not the only country that has good reason to claim 
the role of a bridge between Europe and Asia. Russia has maybe even better reasons and, 
arguably, so do the Caucasian countries like Armenia, Georgia or Azerbaijan (which is also 
defined as predominantly Muslim). Asia is not Islamic only, it includes such large countries as 
India, China and Japan; that is why from this point of view, Turkey’s role as a bridge to Asia 
would be comparatively limited. The argument here is primarily geopolitical: bringing the bor-
ders of the EU (i.e. of the West) closer to key regions in Asia. In this perspective, such a role 
would be much more in the interest of the USA and NATO than of the EU as an autonomous 
player (Nikolov 2007). Or, rather, such a possible role of Turkey corresponds to the vision of 
the EU more as a strategic actor than as an economic, political and value-based community. 
Also in a geopolitical context, opponents of Turkey’s EU accession point to the use of the 
Turkish minorities for overt Turkish expansion, even if not necessarily a military one. For ex-
ample, a demographic expansion which, in the longer term, would change the demographic 
ratios in some European countries, including Bulgaria, in favour of the Turkish communities. 
This would lead to corresponding political changes. As Bulgarian political analyst Ognyan 
Minchev notes: 
If today approximately ten percent of Bulgaria’s citizens are ethnic Turks, after the 
visa restrictions on Bulgarian territory are lifted the ratio will change fast, becoming 
similar to that in present-day Cyprus (Minchev 2006). 
The suspicion that Turkey has not abandoned its expansionist plans as we know them from 
the history of the Ottoman Empire is another argument used by accession opponents. Con-
versely, proponents define the role of Turkish communities in European countries as a posi-
tive one, since these communities will facilitate Turkey’s future integration and help allay fears 
of ‘Turkish immigrant expansion’. 
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The geopolitical arguments, however, also promote a vision of the EU as a ‘fortress’ defend-
ing the prosperity and security of Europeans. Especially if the ‘bridge’ role is understood as a 
metaphor for barriers, such as the drawbridge over a moat surrounding the fortress walls. 
 
3. Military Strategic Arguments 
The arguments used primarily by proponents of Turkey’s EU accession also include military 
strategic ones. Proponents point out, for example, that with its strong army (400,000 troops), 
which is actually the largest in Europe, Turkey ought to be of special interest to the EU and its 
European security and defence policy. This argument is supported by military experts, includ-
ing NATO experts, because whenever there has been an arguable need for EU military par-
ticipation in resolving different conflicts (for example, in Bosnia), European collective partici-
pation has often been ineffective – owing to the lack of a joint effective military mechanism, 
but also owing to the fact that the only national armies in Europe capable of conducting mod-
ern warfare effectively are those of Germany, France and Britain. 
On the other hand, the same argument – concerning the strong Turkish army – is also used 
by accession opponents. Above all, because of the very close connection between the Turk-
ish armed forces and US military support for Turkey. As Turkey is a key strategic partner of 
the USA in the region, it gets significant American military assistance. In exchange, the Turk-
ish government provides political and logistic support to the USA, especially in the operations 
in Iraq but also in Afghanistan. Turkey is no doubt a key military factor in the region. But it is 
precisely because of the strong US-Turkish ties that opponents of Turkey’s EU accession 
warn of the danger that it may serve as ‘America’s Trojan Horse’ – in the same way as Gen-
eral de Gaulle long regarded Britain when he was president of France. The UK became a 
member of the European Community in January 1973 – after the retirement and even after 
the death of de Gaulle. In an extensive article published by the Bulgarian Diplomatic Society, 
Simeon Nikolov notes the following:  
With Turkey as a Trojan Horse in the future EU, ten to fifteen years from now the USA 
would be able to exert pressure and manipulate important international issues in its 
interest (Nikolov 2007). 
This is not the only military strategic argument of accession opponents. Some critics of Tur-
key’s accession base their case on anti-military considerations. In their view, the fact that the 
argument about Turkey’s strong army is used so often – at that, not only by Turkish politicians 
but also by Turkish intellectuals – is alarming. That is because such frequent use implies a 
vision of the EU as a military-political organisation, something like ‘NATO’s European pillar’. 
In the same vein are the arguments of accession opponents that Turkey would demand to 
play the role of a regional hegemon. Such a role would suit a NATO member country (which 
Turkey has long been) much better than an EU member country. It is precisely in the mixing 
of roles and organisations with different goals and of a different character (NATO and the EU) 
that critics of Turkey’s bid for EU membership see a significant problem when the argument of 
‘the strong Turkish army’ is used. 
 
4. Socio-economic Arguments 
Socio-economic arguments are also significant in the debate on Turkey’s EU accession. Such 
arguments are used both by proponents and opponents. 
Turkey as a huge and dynamically developing market is an argument used by proponents. In 
their opinion, this is Turkey’s most important advantage, as it will help increase the competi-
tive power of the European economy. In contrast, accession opponents argue that the Turkish 
market is far below EU standards, therefore Turkey will need decades before it succeeds in 
meeting EU requirements. Such a long period of adjustment will probably be futile and will 
give rise to anti-European sentiments in Turkey itself, they claim. 
The question is whether we conceive of the EU only or primarily as a common market – in the 
form of which the European Communities originated more than fifty years ago. If that is our 
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vision for the EU, then expanding this common market by including the large Turkish market 
is an indisputable advantage. 
Analysing the specific advantages and risks that Turkey’s accession will have for Bulgaria, 
some Bulgarian economists4 conclude the following: 
The concrete effects that an improvement of investment opportunities in Turkey will 
have for Bulgaria are not so directly related to the prospect that Bulgarian companies 
will invest in the neighbour country and vice versa. The more significant effects for the 
Bulgarian economy will come from the opportunities for establishing regional clusters 
(Hristova/Ganev/Bogandov 2006: 24). 
At the same time, they point out the negative effects as well: redistribution of EU structural 
funds and, to a lesser extent, influx of cheap labour. 
This last is a standard argument against the EU’s enlargement by way of countries which are 
economically poorer than the others. Similar arguments were also used against the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania. The main point in this argument is that the richer countries must 
foot the bill for the adjustment of poorer countries; that the citizens of richer countries must 
pay for the citizens of poorer ones. The Open Society Institute study quoted above also 
analyses the effects of Turkey’s accession on the EU budget (Hristova/Ganev/Bogdanov 
1006: 15–17). Viewed from a purely economic perspective, this argument seems plausible. 
But from a political perspective, the decision to admit or reject a candidate country must be 
made with a view to more strategic goals. The EU budget itself consists of contributions 
amounting to a tiny fraction of the GDP of member countries and is therefore a relatively light 
burden on the national economies. 
In the case of Turkey, the argument concerning its relative poverty cannot be pivotal in de-
termining Bulgaria’s stance on the issue of accession precisely because Bulgaria was (and, to 
some extent, remains) in a similar position in the EU – Bulgaria was admitted despite similar 
objections, which goes to show that European integration is above all a political process. The 
other view – primarily of a common market governed by the logic of economic efficiency and 
effectiveness – cannot be the only criterion. As ordinary economic logic is often in contradic-
tion with other, social and political logics, even the very calculation of cost-effectiveness (as a 
ratio of costs and benefits) can no longer be limited only to material benefits but must also 
count all social and political benefits. 
The most significant arguments against Turkey’s accession are the expected waves of huge 
economic immigration from the Muslim world. The fears in Europe are of a qualitative change 
in an already existing situation in which countries like Germany, France, Austria or Belgium 
already have large Turkish minorities, whose integration seems problematic. In several texts 
on the subject, Ognyan Minchev argues extensively that such fears are justified precisely 
from the point of view of Bulgaria and its demographic balance. He claims that the danger of 
permanent settlement of large Turkish communities in Bulgaria if Turkey joins the EU is a real 
problem for Bulgarian society (Minchev 2006).5 
In addition to everything else, these arguments are in line with old historical prejudices, which 
are common enough in Bulgarian society and are now used to promote various nationalist 
strategies. The main fear here is of a ‘new Turkish bondage’ understood as a change (demo-
graphic, and subsequently economic and political), as a result of which the Turks will become 
a majority in Bulgaria and impose their views on the Bulgarians who will have become a mi-
nority. Underlying such fears (and arguments against Turkey’s accession) is a specific con-
cept of the EU as a ‘union of nations’ in which each nation has its own space, guaranteed se-
curity and autonomy, and is never subservient to another’s will. This is a concept of the EU 
without supra-national powers, of a community made up of separate national communities, of 
some sort of communitarianism with supra-national institutions. 
 
                                                 
4 Asenka Hristova, Georgi Ganev and Lachezar Bogdanov from the Centre for Liberal Strategies and Industry Watch. 
5 One of the participants in the aforementioned e-vestnik discussion forum formulates these fears very clearly: 
‘Europe already has enough problems caused by immigrants who are Muslim, and if a wholly Muslim country joins 
the Union these problems will become, in my opinion, unsolvable, while the Kosovo syndrome will spread to many 
parts of Europe’ (http://e-vestnik.bg/2907). 
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5. Socio-political Arguments 
Among the arguments for or against Turkey’s EU accession, socio-political arguments have a 
special place. The main argument against is the often-emphasised deficit of democracy in 
Turkey and its incapacity to meet ‘the Copenhagen criteria’. This deficit of democracy means, 
according to opponents who cite the European Commission’s latest report, that: 
Turkey is not fulfilling key political commitments undertaken in the course of negotia-
tions; does not guarantee observance of human rights, protection of minorities, free-
dom of speech, religious freedoms, independence of the judicial system; does not 
exercise politico-civil control over the armed forces in the country; and is not normalis-
ing its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and Armenia (DSB 2007). 
The above quote is from a special declaration of the DSB on the negotiations between the EU 
and Turkey. 
Observance of the rights of the person in general is one of the main lines of criticism of Tur-
key and will most likely be one of the most critical points in accession negotiations. Especially 
as regards private freedoms like inviolability of the person or public freedoms like freedom of 
speech and religious freedoms. The trial against Orhan Pamuk, mentioned earlier, is just one 
of the examples of these problems. On the other hand, the EC notes that Turkey has made 
significant progress in this area; furthermore, considering that all countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe succeeded in making such progress in about fifteen years, proponents are 
certain that present-day Turkey is capable of meeting the political criteria for accession. 
The question of ethnic minorities and especially of the Kurds has a special place among these 
criteria. This sphere is especially sensitive for the EU. The question has two aspects: legal 
and factual. The legal aspect is related to the enumeration in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne of 
the communities in Turkey which have the status of ethnic minorities. This treaty, which Turk-
ish governments have been citing for years, does not mention the Kurds. On the other hand, 
the Kurdish community in Turkey is a large one, it lives in a comparatively poor region of the 
country and is associated with the long guerrilla war which the radical party PKK has been 
fighting against the Turkish governments, using any means, including terror against civilians. 
In a special survey from 2003, The Economist notes the following: 
Until last year, when Turkey passed liberalising laws aimed at being accepted into the 
European Union, the Kurdish language and even the word '“Kurdish” were banned. 
People are still being arrested for speaking Kurdish in public and for demanding 
Kurdish-language education, even though these are now supposedly legal. (The 
Economist 2003). 
The situation in Turkey is complicated by the circumstance that unlike the Kurds in Turkey, 
since 1991 the Kurds in neighbouring northern Iraq have enjoyed autonomy. 
The issue of ethnic minorities is also sensitive for Bulgaria, which has dramatic experience in 
this area as well. The Bulgarian Turks are very well-integrated, do not support separatist 
trends and have political representation in the form of the DPS. This is often referred to as 
‘the Bulgarian ethnic model’, which has helped keep ethnic peace and political stability in the 
country. The Kurds in Turkey are not in the same situation, even though quite a few of them 
have been integrated into Turkish society – but in exchange for distancing themselves from 
their Kurdish identity. 
On the other hand, the Bulgarian opponents of Turkey’s EU accession cite the situation of the 
Kurds but are at the same time very critical of the political role of the DPS in Bulgaria. This 
gives rise to a paradox, as there is in fact a double standard regarding the political represen-
tation of ethnic minorities. The DPS is criticised for having monopolised the political represen-
tation of Turks in Bulgaria. As Ognyan Minchev writes: 
The other face of the DPS is the face of a centralised, monopoly ethnic corporation 
which is pursuing a slow, persistent and aggressive strategy to isolate the ethnically 
mixed regions in Bulgaria and place them entirely under its hegemony and control’ 
(Minchev 2006: 2). 
The reasons for this, however, largely lie in the other political parties, which have failed to find 
a way to win more significant support from the Bulgarian Turks. As for the Kurds, one of the 
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main criticisms against the Turkish governments is their banning of Kurdish political parties, 
i.e. of ethnic-based parties. This, however, is the subject of dispute in Bulgaria as well (the 
Bulgarian Constitution contains a provision banning ethnic-based parties, which is also criti-
cised by the EC). This has not stopped the DPS, which has never proclaimed itself to be an 
ethnic party, from operating as a lawful party. 
Finally, one of the main arguments of accession opponents is the role in politics of the Turkish 
army, which has been granted the right to intervene outside the accepted democratic proce-
dures. There is another paradox here, as the army in Turkey has represented itself as a guar-
antor of secularism and has intervened to prevent the Islamisation of the country. 
Proponents of Turkey’s EU accession insist that guaranteeing the secular character of the 
state and countering Islamist tendencies is an important condition. That is why allowing the 
military elite to have some role in politics seems admissible. This, however, is inadmissible in 
the EU according to accession opponents. On the other hand, there is the question of guaran-
tees against fundamentalist Islamism. The EU, too, is not protected against the risk of the 
coming to power by democratic means of parties which subscribe to non-democratic princi-
ples, such as xenophobia, or which use religious arguments to justify the exclusion of particu-
lar communities. However, observance of democratic standards in the EU is obligatory. Thus, 
Turkey would hardly be an exception. As Borislav Angelov writes in a positive commentary: 
The EU needs a democratic Turkey which will be an inseparable and indivisible part 
of it, and whose desire and intention in this respect must be supported. The EU must 
not allow even a shadow of suspicion or send the slightest signal that it does not want 
Turkey, because this will clear the way and possibility for Turkey’s Islamisation (Ange-
lov 2006). 
 
* * * 
Specifically Bulgarian arguments have also appeared in the debates on Turkey’s EU acces-
sion. The first type of such arguments is associated with the political role of the DPS, noted 
above. Bulgarian nationalist circles are convinced that the DPS is Turkey’s ‘Trojan Horse’ in 
Bulgarian politics, and that it is precisely the DPS’s participation in the presently ruling three-
party coalition as well as its almost uninterrupted participation in government that has deter-
mined the positive attitude of the Bulgarian governments towards Turkey’s EU accession. The 
only political parties that officially oppose Turkey’s accession are Ataka and the DSB – all 
other parties officially support its candidacy. Additional arguments include the demands for 
compensations which Turkey must pay for confiscated property of what are known as the 
Thracian Bulgarians (Bulgarian refugees from Aegean Thrace in the aftermath of the Balkan 
Wars) if it wants to receives Bulgaria’s support for membership.6 
At the level of mass attitudes, however, things look quite different – at least judging from 
Internet discussion forums. There is a significant sector in Bulgarian society, which thinks that 
Turkey has no place in the EU. Although its arguments differ, the common view is that of ‘civi-
lisational incompatibility’. This last is based on a persistent prejudice – which is, incidentally, 
found among generations of Europeans too – about ‘Europe’s superiority’ as compared with 
the rest of the world. Added to this is the specifically Bulgarian ‘memory of the Turkish bond-
age’ which is somehow transmitted automatically from one generation to another and must 
not be forgotten.  
Still, the debate goes on because, as the proponents of Turkey’s integration note, the EU was 
created precisely for this purpose: to overcome old historical conflicts and to create an effec-
tive community of nations sharing common political values based on respect for the rights of 
the person, guaranteeing public and private freedoms, and developing the rule of law. 
 
                                                 
6 Evgeni Kirilov, an MEP from the BSP, has moved an amendment to a resolution of the European Parliament, de-
manding the following: ‘The EP shall call on the Turkish authorities in a spirit of goodneighbourly relations to activate 
their dialogue with Bulgaria for settling the unresolved mutual claims regarding property, social and financial ques-
tions, including the right to ownership and compensation, of Thracian Bulgarians according to the Treaty of Angora’ 
(Sega, 19 September 2007). 
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